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THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL. REVIEW IN JAPAN 
By 1 TOYOJI . KAKUDO 
I 
In the democratic countries of the world， we can see many kinds 
of judiciaI systems， whicb may be classified into two groups; tbe 
one grQUp wbere the court. has not a power to review tbe consti-
tutionaFty .of Ia.wsi >aI1d; tbe ，otber in. Wbicb judiciaI. review is 
estabIi号bed..In tbe latt~r g!"ocup， there Clre two representative types. 
The弘前 .typeis Americeln system， and凶emodel of the Iatter 
is tbe system of constitutionaI白judgement(die Verfa:;sungsgericbts-
bark~it) instituted in AustriaI:9-1920.， an.d in West Germany in 1947. 
In America wben tbe court， .inrendering a decision to a particular 
case， basa doubt about tbe constitutionaIity of tbe Iaw wbich is 
going to apply to. the.case，. it wi1I undertake 'review of this .law; 
Tf it .find~ .the law unconstitqt¥on叫 itwiJl refuse the. appIication 
of tbis law to tbec;ase. :Wbile in tbe constitutional judgmept system， 
the COllstitutional Cour~ (der Verfassup.gsgerichtshof or das Verfas-
sungsgericht) is organized， differ from ordinary courts，' q.nd has 
proper Tight and duty to d~term~ne tbe constitutionality of law itself. 
When the Constitutional Court decides 'a Iaw unconstitutional， the 
~aw is. abol~shed and it loses its gener<;l.l validity. 
'The courts.in. Ame:t;Ica are: emPowered to review tbe. consti-
tutionality of .1aws :(Totb. the .$tqte's. and fedral. Iaws).. However， 
such power is onJy derived.from the inferentialinterpretation of the 
Constitution~ es会eとiaIIyArticle II， ~ 2 para. 2， and ArticIe VI， 
para. 2， and there is no explicit provision in the Cop.stitution to 
confer upon the court sucbpower. :.J七maybe said tha.t tbis power. 
of tte cQurt wa.s estaQlished by the decisiρP of Cbief Justis MarshaI1 
at tbe instanc.e of the Ma.rbuey. v. Madison， and this decision c1ari-
fied the par:t of the Constitution， wbich hs.d remained doubtful owing 
to . tbe absense of. a definite clause in tbe Constitution regarding 
this pojnt. . At any rate .thil:? pow:er of judicia.I review is recognized 
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as an autbority of tbe court tbat bas ordinary judicial power; it is 
said tbat judicial review is included in tbe autbority of tbe court. 
1t means tbat judicicial review sbould be conducted witbin tbe limit 
of tbe conception of judiciary， itsbould not be an 'action going 
beyond tbe limit of ordinary judiciary. 
On the otber band， tbe constitutional judgement now in practice 
in West Ger・manyand once adopted by Austria in 1920 di旺ers.from 
judielal review of Americu.， The Constitutional Court， wbicb was 
Bpecially createc1 by the Constitution of these countries， does not 
bear tbe ordinary cases. Tbis special court， besides determination 
of the constitutionality of acts of legislature， takes cognizance of 
various controversies concerning the Costitution. And tbe require-
ment for opening procedu1'e and tbe effect of the decision of tbe 
constitutional judgment is exp1'essively provided by tbe Constitution 
or by tbe laws based upon tbe Constitution. 1t is tbespecial action 
distinctly separated from tbe actionof ordinary courts. 
Art. 81 of tbe new Constitution of Japan adopted 1946 provides 
as follows: “Tbe Supreme Court is ，tbe court of last resort witb 
power to c1etermine tbe constitutionality' of any law，'; 'o1'der， Iregu-
Ia，tion 01' 0伍cialact." And in Art. 98， itis furtber provided !“Tbis 
Constitution sba11 be tbe supremelaw of tbe nation' and '10 law， 
ordinance， imperial rescript or otber act， of government;or' part 
tbereof， c011trary to tbe provisio11S bereof， sba11 bave legal force or 
validity. " 
1n Japan tbere are opposing opinions on the， interpretalion of 
these provisio11S. For examples:' Onesays， this is the adoption of 
¥judicial review of America which has been established after a long 
period of tbe experimentation. Another says， it is tbe system of 
Japan whicb is devised after the. American model and resembles to 
tbe system of constitutional judgement of Europe. Tbe former is 
more prevalent and among tbose there are confiicting opinions about 
some matters such.as the requirement for the opening， procedure 
of the review and for the effect of the decision. 
The Supreme Court' of. Japan， bitberto， examinedmore tban' 
once， the constitutionality of laws applicable only to 80me ordinary' 
concrete cases. But， 80 far， no law was yet pronounced unconsti-
tutional. Tbus the Supreme Court bas' bad no occasion to clarify 
its stand on the e百ectof decision holding a law unconstitutional.: 
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But， sooner 01' later， the Supreme Court wiU be confronted with the 
necessity of making its own stand clear. 
1n order to introduce scholar's opinions on the question in Japan， 
it 'might be' pro五tableto gIance over the practices and theories 
of America and' Europe， • which form the. bases . ofthe Japallese 
opmluns. 
n 
Tbe reason why th~ .i\meric~n courtsreview tbe constitutionality 
of a law is tbat sucb action is thou.gbt to be a part of an ordinary 
prQceedings of ttIe court. .So tbe court examines theconstitutionaIity 
of a Iaw only in connection with -some case oi' controversy， but 
not tbe law itself cut of from the ordinary proceedin'g. In otber 
words， tbe court takes . sucbacthuJ.守 ¥vbe託thereis ari actual contro-
V釘syin respectQf ind!?idヰa)fi~幹子 T均efory， th~ judicial review 
hROtsuppose4td takep!汗eJiE，gzctipi01130r made suit where 
tbere: is . I10 . representation" 'of' aCtual intere号tsof the plainti妊 and
出pendantρorin戸ho??C仰向efFtheminti百basno substantial 
interest to be hroughtもUP.7)/Ne¥出.erwill tbe court give mere opini-
oris' oil' s1:lits~ 出ougI14 戸持 sþぬ牧民 po?tt does-?AC any rate， 
the review of tbe constitutionality of a law takes placeonly when 
tJie judgmenf of a conerete ordinary case occurs， and no law alone 
aside from a rear'casebeeomes the object of tbe revie'w. 1n America 
the constitutionaIity. of almy is not' tr~ated as an abstract matter. 
The codstitui01141ityd352 同サ i?1白井:匂~~g to be generalized， 
instead;' it comes frorr( tbe' judgmerit of the facts of a concrete case 
constituting the substaricC! of tbe judgment: the constitutionality 
of a law 'can only be deddea in accordarice with every individual 
case:Tbis is the natural'restriCtion de士iving from tbe essence of tbe 
judiciaJpower. T品entbis'd~dsiol，1 co'ncerns only witb tbe speci五c
intとrestof the partieS:cbncierIiedJ台biIe. theie arises the question of 
the general validitdiof zsach law thatzreceived once unconstitutional 
decisicil'.Opinions . differ on' tbis paint. 
1) Chicago and G.T.R. Co. v. WelIman， 143 Uふ 339，345 (1892) 
Muskrat v. U.S. 219 U. S. 346 (1911) 
2) Massachusetts v. Mel1on， 262 U.S. 447 (1923) 
3) Massachusetts， N巴wHampshire， Maine， Rhodisland etc. 
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Tbe五ststand: 1t is contended tbat as tbe decision of tbe uncon-
stitutiona1ity of a law is rendered in respect of a case .concerned， 
the law tbus considered unconstitutipna1 1Q戸esitsappIicabiIityonly 
tC). tbis case， and tbe rigbt of parties concerned is c1ecided as if .sucb 
law was not in existence. Sucb view migbt furnisb later courts 
tbe ground to ignor tbe law. But tbis view of tbe unconstitution-. 
a1ity concerns only witb tbe parties concerned but not witb tbe 
Iaw itself; the opillion of tbe court or tbe ground on wbicb tbe 
court h:.t日esjts judgment migbt bave a force as. tbe precedent to 
lhe decision ofa simi1ar case， but tbe law is not abolisbed.4)' Tbere-
fore， according to tbis stand， an unconstitutional law is also a law 
01' a legislative act. If sucb a law could be' called invalid. it would 
be invalidity on1y in 'respect of tbe request.5) 
Tbe scbolars wbo take tbis stand are Professor McLaugblin and 
otbers6J Tbey tbink tbe Congress， tbe Executive， and tbe Court bave 
tbe rigbt to interprete tte Constitution 1n their respectivefields. 
Among po1iticians President Je百erson~JaCkson and Linco1n seerri to 
bave entertained practically tbe same view as tbis.1) According to 
tbis view， tbe court cannot suppress tbe.wi1l of Congress， wbicb 
is tbe representative Qf tbe peop1e. . Tbeyseem to bave stood on 
tbe principle tbat tbe court could not perform any actioIl sucb as to 
amend tbe' law passed by Congress. Tbey tbougbt， tbere sbould be 
no sucb situation in wbicb judges would determine tbe direction of 
tbe politics as tbe result of Government's obidel1ce to tbe courずs
interpretation of tbe Constitution. But if tbis tbougbt is. tborougbly 
followed， since tbe Congress， tbe Executive and tbe Court. may eact 
for itself be guided by its own opinion of tbe Constitution， tbe .tbree 
organs of tbe government wi1l be pitted‘against eacb otber. and 
tbe discordance in tbe interpretation .of tbe Constitution wi1 make 
tbe supreme will of a nation ambiguaus. and in an. ~xtreme case 
tbere wiIl be a danger of disruption of the legal order o~ a nation. 
Tbe second stand: 1n accordance witb tbe propositiol1.“no 
unconstitution~l1 law is valid." a Iaw ruled' as unconstitutional 
sbou1d be treated in tbe same manner as it was never existed， even 
4) Shephard v. Wheeling， 30 W. Va. 479 4 S.E. 635 (1887) 
5) A1Iison v. Corker 67 N.J.L. 596 Atlantic 362 (1902) 
6) Corwin; The Doctrine of Judicial Review (1914) p. 23 
7) Huines; The American Doctrine of Judicial $upremacy (1914) .p. 247 f. 
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if it was pronoU，nced unconstitutional at the trial of a concrete case 
flgainst a person. To wit:“an unconstitutional act is not a law; 
it confers no right; it i胆p9，sesno dutie:;:; it a百ordsno protection; 
it creates no 0茄ce;it i?， in l~gal . cqptemplatiop as tbougb it bad 
never been paSseq. ....ハ吋1
This stand is ‘alsobased upon; tbe proposition，:“Tbe interpre~ 
tation of a law is the peculiar and proper 0伍cial;duty of tbe court " . 
The application of any，law l11ust Te done by凶ecourt' and tbe law 
interpreted by tbe cour・tis atrue law. The Constitution is also 
a Iaw and the court interpretes and enforces it. This was wbat 
Chief Justice. Marshall. ，contended . in. M.arbury v. Madison，9) 
Hamilton's reasoning， which took' place earlier tban this， belongs 
on the wbole to tbis stand.tO) 
Dr. Cooly，、furtber，contended tbat a law branded as unconstitn・
tional was invalid from the beginning (vofcl ab initio).ll) However， 
sbould this “inv'alid. from ，tbe ' beginning'~ theory. be followed 
tborougbly， tbere wouldprobably be ，the'legal confusion on some 
occasions， for， in some cases， it may be no Ionger possible as a 
matter of faet to cancel' legal effects brought about by the law 
condemned as unconstitutional.' ! Tben if this theory is enforced， a 
social confusion wi1l result.' Tberetipon in a 'way of an amendment 
to tbe second stand， an increasing number of men stand on the prin-
ciple tbat a law is' p:resumed to be e託ectiveuntil the court dicides 
it invalid. So， by adopting the so-called de facto doctrine i.e. de 
facto corporation and de facto 0自cer，any action taken by corpor-
ations and of五cialsupon tbe strengtb of a law whicb was yet 
not decided unconstitutional is considered to be e任ective.12)
At any rate， 1nptactice of Arperica， it is a custom tbat tbe Congress 
as well as tbe Government， pay i respect to t，he interpretation of tbe 
Constitution by the Supreme Court.， Thus， wha七thecourt declares 
is an actual constitution;and out of many decisions of the courts 
practical constitution ofAmerica， is botn. Tbentbis system is 0妊en
8) Field; In Norton v. Sheby County， 118 U.S. 425， 454 (1885) 
， 9)， Chief J ustice Marshal1 in MarTury， V. Madison， 1， cranch 177 
10) Hamilton; Federalist No. 78 
11) Cooly; Constitutional Lhnitations 7th ed. 1903 p. 259 
12) Mabel v. Nosworth 198 Kp. 847 
Lang v. Mayor of May'onne 74 N.J，L.455 
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called “Judicial Supremacy". But， even so， inAmerica there is a 
rule tlmt tbe Court exercises notbing but its original function i.s. 
ordinary judgment to try cases. Therefore， when the court. holds 
some law as unconstitutional， itdoes not mean that the law . was 
abolished perfectly. And its holding has no power to erase this law 
out of the Code Book. Moreover the custom that the Congress and the 
Government 0 b~y the Supreme Court's interpretation of tbe Consti-
tution Is not tln absolute rnle expressively providεd in the Consti-
Lution. Accorc1ingly，七 maybe possible upon rare occasions that 
the Congress， disobeying tbe courγs interpretation of the Consti-
tution， reenacts a similar law as that since was hold unconstitutional 
by the Suprome Court， and.the Supreme Court; after a1， changes its 
interpretation of the Constitution.1S) Such fact as this， that is to 
say， that the Supreme Court Can not alwaY¥3 compel the Congress 
to its interpretation of the. COl1stitution， may be tbe situation that it 
does not overstep its proper judicial authority， • Ifsuch exceptional 
cases should occur frequently， the similar sitl1ation， .as was noted 
in the五rststand， would come i1;to being. But should such standむe
consistenly always fo11owed， the uniformity of a nation'swi1l w0111d 
crumble down. On the other hand， a throughgoing pbse:rvance.of 
the second stand would result. in a situation in which thecourt 
would .commit itseIf to an act byyond its priginal jud，~cia;l power.守+1;1
fact in most cases the court of America seems to take the second 
守stand，but its' standpoint seems to be .not so五nalCls to ，cal1se a 
great inconvenience. 
nr 
The system of constitutional.. jl1dgment of Austria in 1920 and 
West Germany in 1947 di妊erfrom the American system. There 
are， in the Constitution of these states and in the laws .enacted in 
accordance with the Constitution" theminute. provisions as to: the 
organization of the Constitutional Court，the requirements for tC.e 
opening procedure of the review and the effect of the law hold 
unconstitutiona1. 
1n the continental 'countries of Europe; general1y the constitu-: 
tion，being regarc1ed as a special class of law， isnot applied iq. the 
13) Crow町 ConstitutionalRevolution (1946) p. 39弘
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ordinary court. The ordinary court handles civil and crirninal cases 
and app1ies laws and ordinances based upon laws. And the admini-
strative litig~tion is. handled by the Adrninistrative Court specially 
organized.These cPUTts have not power gen町 allyto review the con-
号tit11thpalityof tbphw，asloqg 弱.Jtj~ ~l;1acted by the legislature 
h accordance with phe proce如均賃 pre:?crib，ed);)y the Constitution. 
Accordingly， thesy countri~s， ~yen .thqugh tqcy have a rigid consti-
tution， deem that the powel:・ofthe i l1terpr~taHop of the Constitution 
is contained i:p. the powers of legislature， which enacts laws in accor-
dance with the Constitution.‘ Then tte . cotlr~s of these countries' 
must apply the law withotltrais，i~g any q~estion as to its consti-
tutionality; so far as legislature， passeq it thinking it was not 
contrary to the Constitution. . According to the opinion entertained 
in these countries， though the C()nstitution is the fundamental 
law of the nation， itis a .law 10t 長年 tobe ~nforced by the court， 
as it is an abstract law and p;-esc!ibes the ~atter of political sphere. 
Therefore the interpretation and application of such a special 
law must left to ul:te legislatun~， the representative body of the 
people. 1n this way the guarantee of the Constitution is vested in 
tle ligislature. But in sOrpe countries of Europe， the demand for 
making the court the guardian of the constitution by .1etting i~ 
review the， constitutionalityof l!}ws， like the American system， was 
growing strong. I{owever， wh叫 wasrealized in .these countries of 
Europe， was not AmericaIl system but the constitutional judgment 
system. The typical. example is AWltria in 1920 and Germany in 
1947. 
1n this system， considering the cb.~racteristic nature of the 
constitution， a special court called “the Constitutional Court" is 
se七upto handle the c01:1st~tt.ltiOl1al question. . Therefore， the Consti-
tutional Court t~kes up not on1Y. the constitutional controversies 
of persons concerning the. cqncrEtte rights and obligations， but，. as 
its object of judgment， ittakes uP. t4e， law itself. 1n other words， 
it takes up the legislative，action 9f. the assembly and determines 
final1y whether such action of the assembly is constitutional or not. 
However， itdoes not determine the political wil1 bt1t interprets and 
applys the Constitution. And it. starts its work on1y upon hearing 
the complaint brought up by somebody. On this point it may be 
said七hatthe actio 
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ment in wider sense of the term. 
But， since the action of the Constitutional Court is so a peculiar 
one， who and how should the complaint be brought up before the 
Co-nstitutional-Corirt js -expressively provided. Thus， inaccordance 
with-the AustriaI1 ConstIttition adopted in 1920， the e'xamination of 
the law of Land~ could be bronght up by -the Federal -Gbvernmentj 
and thelaw of FedeiaUon-cじuldbe btought up by the Governmerit of 
Lal1c1 for review.Moreover the Constitutional Court could review 
the Iaw tha:t sbalI be-applied-to a definite case hrought up before 
itρBut the -orc1inarタcourtsdid notqhave the power to review laws. 
Tben according to・the:revision of the Constitution in 1929〆the
Austrian Supreme Court anc1 Administrative Court，when they， in 
rendering a decision to a practical concrete case， has-a doubt about 
tbe constitutionality of tbe law， could stop-tbe proceedings and 
bring the law. before the Constitutional Cour色 forreview♂) -In 
Austria， however， the people could not bring the law to' review 
directly to the Constitutional Court. 
In -West Germany theFedral Governmeritj the -Government -of 
Land， and one third of tbe 'members of Bundestag can Inform against 
unconstitutional law to the Constitutional Court.3) :Also， when the 
Superior Courts deem that the law they are going to apply to tbe-
practical case under consideration is unconstitutional， tbey -arrest 
the proceedings and brinft tbe law to the Constitutional Court for 
review:l) Furthermore， urilike Austria， an individual or corporation 
can -use， at the Constitutional Court， a law when it infringes upon 
the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution: But if -the 
reIief could be sought at other courts， itshould be righted at these 
courts at五rst，and inとaseno remedies are satisfactory， lhe五nal
determination may be sought at-the Constitutional Court. However， 
when ~ case is of a general iniportancei or-the parties conc宇rned，
if tried under some other procedure， wi1I su旺era grave advantage; 
the ConstitutionaI Court may decide it as the firs七andlast instante.5) 
Since such 'System ofヒonstittitionaIjudgment examines the law 
1) 1920 Austrian Constitution Art. 140， -para. 1 
2) 1929 Austrian Constitution Ar.t 140， para. 1 
3) 1947 The Constitution of WeSt Germany Art. 93， para. 1 
4) Same as Supra~ Art. -100， para: 1 
5) Gesetz iiber das -Verfassungsgericht:_Art. 90_ 
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itself， ifthe Constitutional Court determines a law， or a partof it， 
unconstitutional， this law or the.part of it loses the general validity. 
However， inAustria， for the.sake of. convenience， the law condemned 
unconstitutional was regarded as a invalid law only. after. this judg~ 
ment :Aheeffect 'of decision且holding.the .1aw l.Inconstitutional did 
notwork retroactively~ i.Therefore， .tl1is law:.was thought tobave 
heen: v'aIid巳unti1it: was PI令nouncedunconstttptional by the Consti. 
tutional Court， even H'lt:.WUs' unconstitutlon科1.. Accordingly，. the 
legaL e任ect;which tbis law bad produced， .wa.ぉ valid..' Then . if.the 
Constitutional Court. decided aマ ceartainlawunconstitutional， a 
de五nite.0缶ce.must proclaim， and tbe law losed itsv.alidity from the 
'date of the proc1amation likethat it was abo1ished. by the legislature. 
However， the Constitutional Court could. prolong the.va1idity. 
of the .1aw. for some duration， of time. : According to. Austrian 
Constitution .adopted :in ..19Z0， the¥period was limited. to not more 
than 6 months，' 'and .not more than‘one year under the Co~stitutio~ 
of 19296).. The pur'pose of the .prolongation is that during this period 
the legislature wi1l品legislate:a law whichwill.be harmonious to the 
provisions of the Constitutioriand. take the )place of. the i one: that 
was abolished.' 
: .In west Germany if a cettain law is. decided unconstitutional 
by the Constitutional Court， the . FederalMinister' of Justis must 
promulgate it in. the Bundesgesetzblatt;7) • The retria.l of a criminal 
case， .which was adjudged by tbis law， riay. be permitted .in accor. 
dance 
otherwise provided in the .prov吋is討ions可 evenif. a deci包凶S討ion，was made 
by tbe virtue of tbe 1拘aw..wh凶ichwas .declared invalid; it will remain 
unchanged. where tbe annulment of the decision is impossible. .But 
such a decision is， nevertheless， unenforceable. .:Against a compul. 
sOry‘execution .the defenceis. p.er担issiblein accordance .with tbe 
provisions under the Civil Procedure. Codeり
Thus u.nder. this system of de!termining th~ constitutionality of 
a law by means of the .constitutional judgment， the scope. ofぬe
invalidity: of a law. condemned as uncQnstitntional : isexplicitly 
de:fined， and; t4us the legalstabi1ity is. kept almost. UIlimpaired.: Qn 
6) 1920 and 1927 Austrian Constitution， Art. 140， para. 3 
7) Gesetz iiber das Verfassungsgericht. Art. 31， para. 2 
8) Same as Supra. Art. 79 
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the other hand， as sucb action is' of a great impottance， the organi-
zatiOl1 of the ConstitutionalCourt and tbe metbod of electiol1 of 
judges require a careful cOl1sideration." In order to give an impartial 
judgment it is ‘claimed tbat tbe election of judges must not be done 
under the poIitical: infiuence， and a long time guarantee. of their 
independent status is necessary. . On the other hahd， itis. contended 
that since they are in tbe position to determine the highest order 
of a nation， viewing from tbe democratic principle， itis necessary 
t.o e lt;d tben to a lirnitec1 term of the 0伍ce，by tbe method in whicb 
the will of tbe people is showed eitber directly or indirectly. And 
as a federal . system， there are requirements to show the wil1 of 
Laender. By compromising and syntbesizing these demands. tbe 
Constitutional Court is or記anizec1. I 
Acαco位rd剖ingtωo tbe Austruin Constit加u比tionof 1920 tbe Na此ti初ona叫1工羽"a
was to elect tbe President (Cbief Jus叫tice的)，Vice-president， 6 Mitglieder 
(member) and 3 ErsatzmitgIieder (Sub member). The Bundesrat 
elected 6 Mitglieder and 3 Ersatzmitg1ieder.9) And there‘were no 
provisions for tbe qualification of tbese judges. After al， the di百erent
po1itical parties constituting tbe legislature elected tbe apportioned 
number of judges of tbe Constitutional Court in proportion to the 
number of seats tbey occupied in tbe.assembly. '.Consequently， the 
ConstitutionaI Court was formed refiecting tbe numerical strengtb 
of tbe assmbly. However， intbe revision of tbe Constitution， wbicb 
was e丘ectedin 1929， the Federal Goverl1ment was to recommend tbe 
President， tbe Vicepresident， more tban. 6 Mitglieder and 3 Ersatz-
mitglieder， and the Fede:raI President was to appoint tbem. And 
tbese judges must be picked from judges of ordinary courts， from 
administrative 0缶cers，or university professors of the judsprudence) 
or of po1itical science. For tbe remaining 6 Mitg1ieder and 3 Ersatz-
mitgIieder， tbe Nationalrat recomended 3 Mitglieder and 2 Ersatzmit-
glieder; tbe Bundersrat recomeneed tbe rest， and tbe Federal Pre-
sident appointed tbem al1. All of tbese judges were required to 
acqire tbe knowledge of the jurisprudeI1ce and the po1itical science 
and on top of it tbey must bave bad engagedmore tban 10years' in 
the profession， wbicb required tbem to complete study'of theabove 
science. And tbe followingpersons were prohibited to become judges 
9) 1920 Austrian Constitution， Art. 147， para. 2 
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of theConstitutional Court: Mernbers of the Nationrat， of the Bun-
desrat， of the Landtag and of .other .general representative bodies， 
and also the 0伍cersof the political parties，rnernbers of. the Federal 
Governrnent. and of the. Gqvernrnent i of the. Land.10) '.Thus， the 
indepe-ndence of the 'Court from the Governrnent was intensified. 1n 
1934， the Constitutional Court was combined with the Adrninistrative 
Cotirt .and called Btindesgerichtshof.ll) 
The Constitutiollal Court .of West Gennanyconsistsof two 
Sepat~， and each Senat 4，時1.2judges. . Tbe. 4 0[" tbe '12 judges. of 
eacb Senat are cbosen frorn tbe judges of the Superior Courts， tbey 
serve ，during the term of their service， at tbeseサcourts.. A term' of 
o伍ceof other judges is 8 years， the .balf of. tbem. is . norninated by 
the Bundestag， tbe otber' balf. by tbe Bundesrat， and the Bundes-
president oppoints them alI.' A definete qualification is required of 
eacb' judge， and none of tbern isaIlowed to b~:!long' to tbe Bundestag 
and tbe Bupdesrat， ahd tbe federaI Governrnent and to tbe simi1ar 
organizations 'of states.I2? Thus， the Constitutional Courtis consti-
tuted witb design suitable for白itsfunction; 
IV 
Now in japan regarding the interpretation of tbe provisions of 
Art. 81 and 98 of the' Japanese Constitution， as was previously' 
rnentioned， tbere are various views ins.uenced by practices and 
tbeories of these foreign coqntries. 
In the arst piace，there aregrpups Qf men who insist pbat these 
provisions are indicative of Japapese adoption of tbe Arnerican 
system advocated by some Arper1caf15，who upheld thearst stand， 
of which a mention was already rnade. According to thern the 
Suprerne Court reviews the constitutionality of a law only in relation 
to concrete case under consideratiori， and if' the court decides tbe 
law unconstitutional， it.wil not be. appli~d only to tbis case. But 
tbis la'r itself is valid， sti1l rnore. 
Professor Ukai is tbe ie~r~se~Fative of the men， w員。 uphold
this stand. He states his opinion totbe following effects: 
10) 1939 Austrian Constitution， Art. 149， para. 2， 3， 4 
11) 1934 Austrian Constitution， Art. 177 and fol1owing. 
12) Gesetz uber das Bundesverfassungsgericht. Art. 2-5 
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According to the provision of Art. 98 of the Constitution， no 
unconstitutional 1aw is valid. It resu1ts from the principle that 
the Constitution is superior to the ordinary 1aw. It is just provision 
as a matter of course， and haye no signi五cancein itself. But the 
question is who decides a 1aw “unconstitutiona1ヘai1dto what extend 
is. the decision e百ective. According to Art. 81 of the Constitution， 
the Supreme Court have the power to determine the constiti1tionality 
of any 1aw. But this power of the Supreme Court must be appro・a
priate for a 1aw court. The law cO'¥lrtmust decide on1y practical 
and concrete case cOl1cerning parties. Therefore the court have 
the power to review on1y such a law that is going to apply to the 
concrete case concerning parties. So whichever way the decisiOn 
may be， itis e百ectiveon1y so far as the case under consideration 
is concerned. 
This opinio丸、he.thinks， isright， as it is aproper request for 
the court not to encroach upon the power of the legislature， taking 
into consideration Art. .41. of the Constitutiol1， wtich‘expressive1y 
provides: “The Diet stall be the highest orga:n of state power and 
shall be the sole 1aw-making organ of the state ぺ Andit is demo-
cratic request七hatjudicial review of the court should be restricted 
from the position and function of the Diet. He also upholds bis 
position by taking two or three other reasons to sUpport his opinion.n 
The second group of scholars takes the second stand of the 
American conte'ntions as. have been previously mentioned. They 
upbold the view that the review of the constitutionality of a law is 
permited only in connection witb the tria1 of a concrete case con-
eerning parties， bi1t tbe law e.ecieed unconstitutional 10se its general 
validity. Professor Kaneko upholds this principle and states bis 
idea in the following 'manner: 
An unconstitutional law is inva1id' in accotdance with Art. 98 
of tbe Constitutidn; It is a result of its being unconstitutional. 
A1so according to Art: 81 of tbe Constitution tbe Supreme Courl bas 
tbe power to determine tbe constitutionality of any law. But this 
power sbou1d not be 1imited simply to interpret tbe Constitution and 
adjudge tbe constitutionality usual1y in his own field. Sucb power 
iィ!avetheoretically not on1y the Supreme Court but al national' 
1) Ukai; The Effect of Decions .Holding Statute Unconstitutional， inKokka Gakkai 
Zassi VoI. 62 No. 2. 
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organs， for instance tbe Diet as weIl as tbe Cabinet. Tbe faet tbat 
Art. 8:L of tbe Constitution bas given tbis power specifical1y to tbe 
Supreme Court must be taken into recognition.tbat tbis is a pecuIiar 
power wbicb no otber nationaI orgam~ bave. So 'it must be construed 
tbat tbe decision of tbe Supreme Court bas ageneral binding e百ect
as a finaI judgme昨 overal ・nationalorgans and a1 matters， and， 
accordingIy，. tbe law held' unconstitutional lTses its validity abso-
lutely.2) 
Professor Miyazawa， too， ent;ertams about tbe same opinion 
as above. He argues: if a law once decided unconstitutionaI by 
tbe Supreme Court is not objectively regatded as invaIid， itwould 
cause，first of a1， a considerable inconvenience actual1y. For 
instance， a person is imposed a tax and be appIies to tbe court~ so 
tbe court takes action to examine tbe law. And if it decides tbe 
law unconstitutional， tbe tax suitagainst tbe plainti百， as a matter 
of course， iscanceIled.. But if tbis law is，vaIid objectively. stilI 
more，出 it'is insisted;' anotber persons l，nder tbesarne circums-
tance would be responsible for tbe' taJC 'unless. he makes tbe same 
complaint against tbe imposition' as. was done by tbe first party. 
Also pprsons，who had already paid the tax，could sue for return 
of tbe U10ney tbat tbey bad paid， claiming tbat wbat be. bad paid 
was an unjust enricbment on tbe partof tbe tax 0茄ce.. However， 
sucb many 'Claims， in fact， would causenotbipg but inconvenience. 
Furtber more tbe purpose .of determinrf tbe' constitutionality of tbe 
Iaw is not only to protect interests. of tbe parties concerned， but 
it ratber arms at tbe coriect application of tbe Constitution.3) 
However， neitber of tbem make clear， as to wbetber tbe' Iaw 
decided l， llconstitutional i was invaIid atjts birtb in .every case or 
in some. case it bad been aliv~ until tbis decision and become dead 
only aft，er t.be decision. 
Tbe tbird group contends tbat Japan bas adopted tbe system 
of tbe constitutional judgment， on tbe prQvisions of Art. 81 and 98 
of tbe Consptution. The representative sIJoksman of tbis contention 
is Dr. Sasaki. 
According . tobim， Art， 81ゐoftbe Constitution rnakes tbe two 
points clear; firstly，“Tbe Supreme Conrt is the court of last 
'2) Kaneko; Judicial System， inKokka Gakkai Zassi VoI. 60 No. 12 
3) Miyazawa; Judicial Review of the Court， inThe Law periodical， VoI. 1， No. 4. 
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resort"; secondly，“The Supreme Court has the power to determine 
the constitutionaIity of any law …" The secorid point does not 
only indicate that the Supreme Court has the power to determine the 
constitutiona1ity of any law merely in connection with a concrete 
case concerning parties， but that it rather shows that the SUPreme 
Court determines in general way the constitutionality of any law. 
Art. 99 of the Constitution moreover provides: “The Emperor or 
tbe Regent (¥8 well as ministers of State， meml:iers of the Diet， judges， 
Hl1c1 Hl o¥;l!er public oHicials have the obligation to respect and 
uphold this Constitutibnぺ AndArt. 98 provides that a1 national 
acts contrary to the Constitution have no legal force. 1t means 
that any lawcontrary to the Constitution have no general validity 
perfectly， and does not mean that unconstitutional law is invalid 
only in relation to some suit. However if it is doubtful whether a 
law is constitutional or not， somebody must determine it. Art. .81 
of the C.onstitution bas given the Supreme Court the power to 
determine it. Tben the Supreme Court may determine it， fi.rst when 
i七doubtsthe constitutionality of any law， oder， regulation or 0汀icial
act in relation to some pending case， second when the constitutio・
nality of the law itself and other acts themselves are accused for.Jhe 
Supreme Court. 1n addition it is clear from the provision that what 
the Supreme Court performs in. this regard is a determination of 
the constitutiona1ity but not simply review. Accordingly， whichever 
it may determine， itis implied that everyone should regard. this 
decision as五nal. But the Supreme Court does not abolish the law 
but simply determines its unconstitutionality. However the uncon-
stitutional law becomes inva1id as the effect ofArt. 81. 
He argues further: the determination of the constitutionality of 
a law is the power vested only inthe Supreme Court. Inferior 
courts have not別chpower as to determine the general constitutio・
nality， but only in relation to judgment of practical and concrete 
case， they may review the constitutionality of the law which is to 
be applied to the case. Their judgment of th~ constitutionality of 
a law is justifi.able only in relation to this case under tria1.4) 
The above are the opinions on the question. in '}apan. 1 think 
4) . Sasaki; The Power of the SuprerI'l巴 Court.to Determine the Constitutionality of . 
Lcgislative and Administrative Acts， inKoho Zassi Vol. 11， No. 1 
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tbe tbird. stand is tbe most correct'inte:wretation of tbe Japanese 
Cons.titution. Wben one reads tbe Japanese. ConstitutionゐfaitbfulIy
and witbout bias， one .would reacb tb.e tbird .stand. Jn case of 
America，. ber Constitution makes no' definite . provision for tbe 
question.l ，Consequently，the review of the constitutionality of a law 
]TIay be undertaken as， aq.acH<m. taIVpg ip 牡~~ spber~ of. an ordinary 
judgemeqt of a:q)llcr<tt~ç~9~1: tqt. ，nptas. ~ction~:imed at tbe law 
itself， ql~. 9百fromtte ç~SG・.lIow~ver， 1n Japap. tbe Cons此ution
expressi vely provides柏叫 tTeSup:rem~ Coqrt sbalI determine tbe 
constitutionality of any 1引;vand tbe Constitution does not restrict it 
only 'Yitbin tbe ordinary judiciary concerning， tbe concrete case. 
Tbis. act is simi1a:r to tbe c()nstitutional judgrpent of Austria in 1920， 
or West Germany in 1947. ~ut in. these countries tbe specialIy 
organized court， tbe Constitu~ionaI Court， perfotms sucb Act. ln 
Japan our Constitution， witbo¥lt lnstitutiqg sucb special court， ba$ 
empowered tbe Supreme Court to perform sucb act. . Tl，Ierefore tbe 
Supreme court. is tbe五n?，I符号oft9t an orqinary judgment~ as well 
as tbe ConstitutionaI CqtirL :，fl;1ep，βs. tbe $upremecourt of Japan 
bas sucb important :pow，er，unHl<:e 4m~riql， tbe judges qf tbe Japanese 
Supreme Court may be dismiss吋 bytbe people: ln Art. 79 para. 
2 . iti$ provided “Tbe appointlTIen~ of 凶今 j~dges of tbe Supreme 
Court今sballbe reviewed by tbe people ?t tbe五rstgeneral election 
of members of the House 9~ ~epresent?tiye fOllowing their appoint-
ment .and shal1 be reviewed again at tte first generaI election of 
membむsof tbe House.of Representatives after a Iapse often years， 
and in the same manne:r .tbere after，一incases mentioned in the 
foregoing paragrapb， .wben tbe majority ()f tbe votes. fayors the dis-
missal of judges， be stall be; dismis.sed ク.
However it ned:! to enact a minutely preseribed procedure in 
order to perform .{;iucbconstitutionaI judgment. But now in Japan 
tbere is not sucb procedJlre law.、Tberefore，even if tbe Constitution 
bad made a provision for， sucb a purport，・itwould .be impossible 
to actually， b主ing.such action to. tbe Supreme Court. Tbere is a 
necessity of early condificafion of the. procedure， wbat migbt be 
called "the Code of Constitutional Procedure" like“the Code of 
Civil Procedure" or H the Code of Criminal Procedure.". So， unti1 
such COde. is estabUsbed， after a1， tbe second stand will be suitable 
to cope. w:itb tb 
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tution， as principle; upbolds tbe system as is advocated by tbe 
followers ，of tbe tbird stand， and'I belp to realize tbe condification 
of tbe procedure based on tbe tbird stand. 
But ~bereare opinions in opposition to .tbe tbird stand. As 
bas already been seen， itis expressed tbat if tbe system of tbe tbird 
stai1d were adopted， the Supreme Court inigbt exert pressure' oil 
tbe Diet， violating Art. 41 of tbe ConstitutiOn， wbicb says，“Tbe 
Diet sbull be the bighcst organ of state power:'ぺ Howevertbe，tbird 
stund never maintain that tbe Supreme Court is bigber organ than 
the Diet. No doubt， tbe Diet is tbe bigbest organ of tbestate， it
makes laws which tbe court obeys and ap'plys， al1d itdecides' the 
system of tbe court. But the court could not obey unconstitutional 
law， because tbe Diet sbould obey tbe Constitution， as above Art. 
99 and Art. 98 says. Tbat is to，say， the bigbest is tbe Constitution， 
not tbe SJ1preme Court. '， Unconstitutiona'l laws are invalid as effect 
of Art. 98 of tbe Constitution. And when a contention arises 
between persons or state organs about tbat some law or other act 
is constitutional or not， somebody mustdecide it. Art. 81 of the 
Constitution give， tbe Supre'me Court tbe power to determine it. 
Tbe Supreme Court' is not bigberthan tbe Diet， but tbe COnstitution 
is bigber tban tbe law. And tbe Supreme Court bas not tbe power to 
order tbe Diet， but tbe power to deterinine the constituUonality' of 
any law by Art. 81. A' determination of tbe Supreme Court tbat 
some law is unconstitutional is a interpretation of tbe Coristitution. 
Tbe invaIid of tbis law is tbe effect of tbe Constitution itself， Art. 
98 of it. Moreover someone may argue tbatsucb stand would give 
the Supreme Court tbe power to abolisb laws， wbicb is" contrary' 
tq tbeprovision of Art. 41， wbicb says:“Tbe Diet sball be tbe 
sole law-making organ of tbe state". However， asit bas been just ， 
mentioned tbe Supreme Court may determine tbe unconstitutionality 
of a law， but it' does not mean to， atolisb it. Tbe Constitutio，n 
invalidates any unconstitutional law by virtue of its own provision: 
Therefore tbe tbird stand， iftaken， by no meansviolates tbe spirit 
of provision of Art. 41 of tbe Constitution. 
1t might as well be considered here the objection tbat may be 
raised agairist tbe tbird stand frorn a 'political 'stan己points. If the 
Supreme Court bas sucb a greaf power. as 'that， by decidingぬe
constitutional question of a lawi it' may come to decide tbe poli 
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question，whichrnay be hidden in the back of such 1aw.' If so， it
would run counter to，' the .dernocratic princip1e: government by 
the wil1. of people. This criticism rnay be raised against judicia1 
review generally， against the五rstand second stands too， but it may 
be most severely butted 'against the third stand. Certainly， the con-
stitutiona1 problem is accustomed to contain the politica1 prob1em. 
Therefore，even if tbe SU'pr~:fl1eCourt does qotdetermin the prob1em 
from..a point of:politic~Ly!ew， bu~ decermlns only. froin a point of 
lega1 yiew， itmay concem U~e VOlltics，i However， above men七ioned，
the Supreme Courtof J&pan ls controled by the people. That is， 
the judges of tbe Supreme Court may be disrnissed by the peop1e 
according to Art. 79， para， ~.. So， even if the Supreme Court has 
such power that the third stand assert， itdoes not run counter 
to . the principle of democracy andsovereignty of people. 
Viewed the merit and demerit of each ofthe above said stands 
from the politica1 stand point， the first stand， ifit is followed， would 
bring an lega1 unstableness， as was pointed out by the scholars who 
insist on the second stand. In Japaq， there is no custom yet that 
the legislature respects and obeys tte court's interpretation of the 
. Constitution.' Therefore the danger: of the legal unsfableness that 
thefirst stand wou1dproduce in -}apan 'would. be larger. On. the 
other hand， ifthe custom， that the court is bound by the precedent 
and the 1egislature and e;xecutive obey the court's interpretation 
¥vithout exception， isestabIished， the first stand would， after a1， 
become the sarne as the. second stand. 
Then， ifthe second stand is fOllowed， a Iaw once determined as 
unconstitutional wou1d lose its general validity. Such determination 
is in the resu1t a decision about the validity of law itself， and is 
connected. with the public m&tters. : Evensuch decision is dop.e only 
in rer~tion to a private event or controversy; many men would be' 
concetned withit. Tterefore: it is. good system that such decision 
of public matters，'even if thete is not ~ private case orcontroversy， 
can be requested as the. public prob1em. ， And it is the third stand，: 
my stand. . In the first or second stari.d，even.if some 1aw is doubtful 
about the constitutionality， no ~me cou~d accuse this 1a¥v， until a 
concrete case in regard tq private right ari$es; But in the ttird stand， 
the 1a w itself would be accused. at once' without the concrete case. 
]apanese Ii
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in general. But in some points， for the sake of Japanese pecuIiarity， 
it mac1e different from American system. Art. 81 and Art; 79 para. 2 
are this examples. 1n America， such， as the third stand ，of Japan 
can not exist. But in Japan， there can be it from above Article，of 
the Constitution. 
The adoption of the new Constitution hasbegun to democratize 
al Japanese institutions， but it can not be say tha:t the people has 
fully and througbly grasped the spirit of democracy. Recently the 
reactionnry iuIluence tends to expand， again， and 1 fear they may 
rnal日 upa balf of tbe Diet members by cbance， and legislate a law 
contrary to the Constitution. At such time a great expectation is 
placed upon the power of the SupremeCourt to determine the consti-
tutionary of a law. Tbough there may stil remain the question 
whefher the judges of the Supreme Court is equal to this demand， 
，at any rate it would be right for present }apan to recognize the 
system advocated by the tbird stand. 
v 
1n a word， the system of judicial review of legislation is an 
expansion of the principle of “rule of law n to acts Qf the， Diet. 
Tbe adherents of the五rststand attempt to establisb the rule of law 
by pusbing tbe principle of tbe equal division of tbree powers. But 
if tbis principle goes to tbe bottom too thoroughly， itwould break 
up the unity of a will of state; Tben tbe second stand would become 
tbe most practical one to be followed. But if tbe effect of secOnd 
stand gets at the root and its idea is spread out， itgrows the third 
stand. However such tbird stand 'may be no more the otdinary 
judiciary" but a new special function of tbe state， wbich goes ratber 
beyond the old principle of division of three powers. At any rate 
it trys to carry out more， tboroughly the purpose of rule of Iaw， 
by expanding the principle of rule of Iaw to tbe legislative五eldof 
tbe Diet， this is rule of constitutionaI law. 
Formerly， especially in England， the idea of rule of Iaw was 
to estab1ished an order， inwbicb a law .proper1y dec1ared by judges 
would have supremacy over against tbe kiI1g's， despotism. 1t was 
an attempt to expel the rule of man and domination of power and 
establisb a world wbere law rules and reason sways. But to-day tbe 
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people have already become the soverign power of a sta.te instead 
of a despotiC .king， and Par1iament， their representative， has become 
the highest organ of state.. Then. the prihciple of sovereignty of 
Parliament and rule of law are most fundamental in English consti-
tution， but in England there.is.，norigid coPstitution. and the former 
principle is higher than ιhe 'latter~ ;:sut irl iAmerica the rigid constiヲ
utiont. was established， tbenthe trindple of rule of law grew tbe 
bighest principle. 1n thIs c:ountry， no matter how democratized the 
legislature and executive may be， they are confined to tbe legal 
boundary established by tbe Constitution， new Japanese Constitu-
tion not only modeled but enlarged this American doctrine. 
But， thougb this is tbe spirit of rule of Iaw， the law tbat 
is ruler， after al， isdeclared by judges， who are not always infal-
lible. If these men interprete tbe constitution arbitrari1y and declare 
it dogmaticalIy， itwould be degenerated into “ruIe of few men " 
or “judicial obligarcbyぺ Tbenin Japanese Constitution， itprovides 
tbat the judges of the Supreme Court must be. recognized or dis-
charged by tbe people， but tbis voting is not so often tbat it would 
impair tbe independence of tbe Court. 1n this way， the idea of rule 
of Iaw is harmonized with tbe principleof sovereignty of the people. 
Moreover an intention of this system is to make the fundamental 
order of a nation stable and五xed. This system would prevent tbe 
Constitution from changing with unstableness and fluctuation only 
by rnajority of the Diet. This is the demand to protect minority 
against tbe abuse of the power by the majority. 1t is designed to 
prevent the arbitrary action of tbe majority party of the Diet. 1t 
is restriction of tbe principle of decision by majority and is guarantee 
of the individual freeelom and humanright. 
But of course it does not mean to prohibit to amend the pro-
visions of the Constitution. To invalidate an unconstitutional law 
is to insure not to mend the Constitution without resorting to tbe 
due procedure to amend the Constitution. 1n other words， this systern 
is， after aI， to ins~re the procedure of amending the Constitution， 
wbich is barder than enacting laws. By al means， the Constitution 
must be upheld， but if it should be amended， tbe amendment must 
be carried out constitutionaly only in accordance witb the provisions 
of the Constitution. Art. 96 of the JapaneseConstitution provid 
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七hrougba concurring vote of two-thirds or more of al tbe members 
of each Huuse and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for 
rati五cation，which sball require the a日1'mativevote of a majority 
of al. votes cast tbereon， ata special referendum 01' at 8ucb election 
as tbe Diet shall specify 七 Thentbe action of ameridment of tbe 
Constitution is no more tbe object. of the constitutiollal judgmen七十
The amendment of tbe Constitution is acted and intended by the 
people itself， only by the people. 
